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Foucauldian discourse has been received with varying degrees of enthusiasm within 
feminist circles. Some authors (e.g. Balbus, 1988; Di Leonardo, 1991; Hartsock, 
1990) see a Foucauldian stance as incompatible with feminist theory, while others 
(e.g. Grimshaw, 1993; Hoy, 1988; McNay, 1992; Sawicki, 1988) advocate a positive 
relationship between Foucauldian discourse and feminism. And then there are those 
theorists (e.g. Burman, 1990) who stand between these two positions, stating that 
while Foucault offers useful insights and methods to feminists, it can also be 
dangerous.  
 
Some of the differences in response have to do with particular readings of Foucault, 
or with which period of his writing is focussed upon (Deveaux, 1994). His early 
works centred on the analysis of historically situated systems of institutions and 
discursive practices. In his methodological treatise, the Archaeology of Knowledge, 
Foucault (1972) outlined his analysis of discourse. He later moved beyond the 
attempt to work out a theory of rule-governed systems of discursive practices (which, 
in many respects, came close to structuralism), and utilised the genealogical method 
which allowed him to “thematize the relationship between truth, theory, and values 
and the social institutions and practices in which they emerge” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1982, p. xxv). In his genealogical works (seen, for example, in Discipline and Punish 
and The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1) he isolated components of present-day political 
technologies and traced them back in time. He concentrated on the relations of power, 
knowledge and the body in modern society. Foucault’s genealogical studies tended to 
focus on the micro-physics of power, on the techniques and practices conducted 
between individual human subjects within localised institutions. An objection was 
raised not only by feminists (see later discussion) but also by the Marxist left that his 
attentiveness to the specifics of power left more globalised issues in politics 
untheorised (Gordon, 1991). Partially in response to this, Foucault started his work on 
governmentality which he introduced in a series of lectures in 1978 (Foucault, 1991; 
Gordon, 1991). He argued that the same style of analysis which he used to study the 
installation of power in everyday relations and practices could be applied to 
techniques and practices of governing populations of subjects. In his last works, 
Foucault (1985, 1986) turned his attention to the formation of subjectivity, and what 
he called the “techniques of the self”. 
 
It appears that while Foucault’s thoughts on governmentality have been used by some 
feminists in their research and analysis (e.g. Ruhl, 1999), theoretical debates on the 
usefulness of governmentality for feminism are in relatively short supply. There is a 
concentration on his intermediary works on disciplinary technology and bio-power, 
his later works on resistance and techniques of the self, and his interviews. This 
ellipsis is possibly due to the fact that his lectures on governmentality were 
unpublished until the 1990s, and are available largely from secondary sources 
(Gordon, 1991; Dean, 1994a, 1994b, 1999). In this paper we explore the notion of 
governmentality, grounding the concept in work conducted by the first author in 
adolescent sexual and reproductive health. We argue that Foucault’s work on 
governmentality provides feminists with a broad-ranging and incisive theoretical tool 
for the analysis of gendered relations on a micro- and macro-level. 
FOUCAULT AND FEMINISM 
 
Foucault himself never explored the relationship his work had with that of feminist 
writers, nor did he examine the implications of his work in gendered terms. When he 
commented on the women’s movement, it was in passing, as in one of his interviews: 
“The real strength of the women’s movement is not that of having laid claim to the 
specificity of their sexuality and the rights pertaining to it, but that they have actually 
departed from the discourse conducted with the apparatuses of sexuality” (Foucault, 
1980a, p. 219). Some authors have criticised Foucault for his gender blindness and 
“covert androcentricity” (Soper, 1993, p. 29). For example, he does not consider how 
the treatment of male and female prisoners differed and how these differences related 
to dominant constructions of masculinity and femininity. While this may be true, what 
we should concentrate on, we believe, are the implications of Foucauldian discourse 
for feminism, rather than criticising Foucault for not embarking on a gendered project. 
There are some striking points of convergence between Foucault’s work and the broad 
field of feminism (McNay, 1992; Sawicki,1988, 1991) including: 
 
• a focus on sexuality as a key area of political struggle; • an expansion of the political 
to include social domination; • a critique of biological determinism, humanism, and 
the search for a scientific “truth”; • a critical stance concerning human sciences 
insofar as they have participated in modern forms of domination; • an analysis of the 
politics of personal relations and everyday life; • a critique of the rational subject. 
 
There are several reservations regarding the usefulness of a Foucauldian framework 
for feminism, including the epistemological concerns that Foucault’s work tends 
towards nihilism and relativism. In this paper we concentrate on the argument that 
Foucault’s focus on micro-politics leaves overall structures of domination unanalysed 
(Alcoff, cited in Sawicki, 1991; Ramazanoglu & Holland, 1993). 
 
MICRO- AND MACRO-LEVELS OF POWER 
 
In his intermediary works, Foucault stressed the importance of formulating and 
studying the question of power relations in terms of “power at its extremities . . .  
where it becomes capillary” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 96), i.e., in the everyday lives, 
actions and interactions of people. Rather than studying the intentional aspect of 
power (which group has it and what is their aim?), Foucault’s project was to 
investigate the practices of power—“where it installs itself and produces real effects” 
(Foucault, 1980b, p. 97). Power, according to Foucault, is not exercised from the 
exterior; it is not possessed by an individual, class or group, nor is it centralised in the 
law, economy or the state. Rather, it is immanent to everyday relationships including 
economic exchanges, knowledge relationships, sexual relations, etc. In other words, 
“micro” does not mean a simple miniaturization of forms but rather mobile and non-
localizable connections. Power is not essentially repressive—it “incites, it induces, it 
seduces [and] passes through the hands of the mastered no less than through the hands 
of the masters” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 71). Foucault’s emphasis on the micro-strategies of 
power has been criticised by some feminists as failing to provide the tools with which 
to analyse overall structures of domination (Alcoff, cited in Sawicki, 1991; 
Ramazanoglu & Holland, 1993). For example, Ramazanoglu & Holland (1993) argue 
that feminists will not find in Foucault a “means of specifying the links between 
men’s exercise of power in particular sexual encounters, and male power more 
generally” (p. 244). Foucault’s acknowledgement, they state, of the cleavages 
between concentrations of power is only intermittent. Furthermore, there is an 
explanatory gap between power in its capillary form and these concentrations of 
power. This criticism indicates a lack of familiarity with Foucault’s work on 
governmentality (possibly unavailable to the authors at the time of writing, as the 
summary and comment on his lectures was published by Gordon only in 1991). 
Nevertheless, we feel that this interpretation even of Foucault’s intermediary work 
(before his work on governmentality was more widely available) is somewhat 
misleading. Foucault did not deny that micro-level practices of power are taken up in 
global or macrostrategies of domination. He merely refused to privilege a centre of 
power which then permeates into the everyday lives of people. Instead, he proposed 
conducting an “ascending analysis of power, starting . . . from its infinitesimal 
mechanisms . . . and then see[ing] how these mechanisms of power have been—and 
continue to be—invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, 
extended etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination” 
(Foucault, 1980b, p. 99). Deleuze (1988), in his book on Foucault, expresses this as 
the relation between power and government, which are molecular or microphysical 
relations around a molar agency, e.g. the Father in the case of the family, Money, 
Gold or the Dollar in the case of the market. Thus, the fact that power is not held by 
any person or group and does not operate from a centre does not mean that people and 
groups are positioned equally within it or that global forms of domination cannot be 
spoken about. For feminism this means that enmeshment in patriarchal culture can be 
acknowledged. Nevertheless, this does not mitigate the fact that men have a higher 
stake in maintaining institutions within which they have historically occupied 
dominant positions (Bordo, 1993). A Foucauldian feminist need not resist the 
empirical claim that male domination has appeared in almost all societies; s/he would 
not desist from the naming of patriarchy. What s/he would object to is the attempt to 
deduce this from a general theory and to privilege one site of domination or one site 
of resistance. Instead, s/he would see power as “exercised from innumerable points, in 
the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations” (Foucault, 1978, p. 94). S/he 
would stress the variety of ways in which effects of male domination are produced 
and gendered identities are constituted. In his endeavour to debunk the 
unidimensional juridico-discursive notion of power (that sees power as essentially 
repressive, possessed by an individual, class or group and centralised in the law, 
economy or the state), Foucault emphasized the microphysics of power in his 
intermediary works. His work on governmentality does not represent a break from 
this emphasis, but rather provides the balance required to intersect micro- and macro-
level analyses. Foucault’s intermediary works have provided feminists with some of 
the theoretical tools needed to shift their analyses of power from a structural 
definition to one in which power relations and the power/knowledge nexus become 
focal. Furthermore, his analysis of how power is installed in everyday (including 
domestic) interactions has allowed feminists to theorise exactly how the personal is 
political. Foucault’s work of governmentality extends this repertoire by augmenting 
the analysis of power at a micro-level to the myriad of ways in which power operates 
at a macro-level. Foucault indicates that modern government is exercised through an 
ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections, calculations and 
tactics (Foucault, 1991). It is a complex system, employing a variety of modes to 
achieve particular ends (e.g. the oppression of women). This dissection of the 
multiplicity and the interconnection of micro- and macro-strategies of power could 
become an important tool in feminist inquiry and practice.  
GOVERNMENTALITY 
 
In this section we outline Foucault’s work on governmentality. We ground our 
theoretical discussion by illustrating, in brief, a feminist application thereof to the 
field of adolescent sexual and reproductive health. We consider this (adolescent 
sexual and reproductive health) to be an important domain of feminist inquiry as 
various underlying assumptions concerning the nature of gendered adolescence, 
adolescent (hetero)sexuality, family formation and function, and motherhood are 
invoked in discursive and social practices concerning sexual or reproductive 
teenagers. Political issues, such as gender relations, education, population control and 
welfare, undergird discussions on adolescent sexual and reproductive health, although 
these are mostly not explicitly acknowledged. In his lectures on governmentality 
Foucault attempts to “cut the Gordian knot of the relation between micro- and macro-
levels of power” (Dean, 1994a, p. 179) by applying the same type of analytic on the 
macro-level that he had earlier applied to the micropowers—one which emphasises 
practices of government. Foucault used the terms government and governmentality in 
inter-related ways. He defined government as the “conduct of conduct” (Gordon, 
1991, p. 2) or, in other words, as an activity which aims to shape, guide or affect the 
behaviour, actions, and comportment of people. The “conduct of conduct” occurs at 
multiple, interwoven levels. It concerns the self relating with the self, private 
interpersonal relations that involve some sort of control or guidance, relations within 
social institutions, and relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty 
(Gordon, 1991). Thus governmentality is simultaneously individualising and 
totalising. On the one hand, governmenatlity is simultaneously subjectivising (i.e. it 
concerns itself with the constitution of individualised subjectivity) and objectivising   
i.e. through the operation of bio-power the individual is transformed into an object or 
docile body). On the other hand, the individual is implicated in large-scale 
normalising structures and regulatory controls. Governmental analysis, thus, attempts 
to interlink the micro-effects of power (e.g. self-technologies) with the macro-
strategies of power without privileging one or the other (see later discussion). 
Foucault defined the term “governmentality” as the rationality or art of government, 
which he explained as a way or system of knowing and thinking about the nature of 
the practice of government. Foucault (1991) indicated that governmentality marks the 
emergence of a new form of thinking about and exercising power. The development 
of the science of government emerged in response to (1) the re-centring of the 
economy on a different plane from that of the family, and (2) the emergence of the 
problem of the population. The family disappeared as a model of government and as 
the site of production. Instead, population, its welfare, the improvement of its wealth 
and health, its capacity to wage war and engage in labour, etc. became the goal of 
government.  
 
The family, however, emerged as “an element internal to population, and as a 
fundamental instrument in its government” (Foucault, 1991, p. 99). The incisiveness 
of this interconnection of governmentality, the population and the family (and hence 
the micro- and macro-strategies of power) is illustrated in some of the discursive 
constructions of adolescent reproduction. Teenage pregnancy and childbearing is 
often depicted as a matter of national concern as early reproduction threatens 
economised security by contributing to demographic disaster (a concern expressed 
mostly in “developing” countries such as South Africa) or by depending on welfare 
(an issue in more “developed” countries). Interlinked with this are concerns about the 
personalised outcomes of early reproduction for the children as well as for the 
mothers. These include such things as maternal poverty and child neglect and abuse. 
Thus, concerns are multi-layered. Humanitarian interest is taken in the individual life 
trajectories of the mothers and children, but this is interwoven with concerns about the 
social and national (population-wide) effects of these outcomes (cf. Macleod, 1999a, 
1999b). The net result is the establishment of institutions (e.g. youth centres), 
procedures (e.g. sexuality education courses), analyses, reflections and calculations 
(e.g. research on teenage pregnancy) and tactics (see later discussion), all of which are 
aimed at reducing the threat of early reproduction to not only the individual child and 
mother but also the population. Furthermore, the family operates as a “fundamental 
instrument” (Foucault, 1991, p. 99) in the government of adolescent sexuality and 
reproduction in that dominant discourses of the family are utilised to produce 
pathologised readings of adolescent reproduction. The pregnant teenager or single 
parent family defy the deployment of normalised familial and gendered relations. 
They fracture conjugal authority by reproducing out of wedlock, as well as the 
developmental imperative of age-specific tasks by having children early. This opens 
the space for them to be positioned as, for example, inadequate mothers. These 
pathologised readings (provided in no small part by expert investigation) in turn form 
part of the appeal to national concern. Present forms of government have, according 
to Foucault, their roots in the disciplinary problems of utility and docility, ancient 
Christian notions of pastorship, a reason of the state, the science of police and the 
advent of liberalism (Gordon, 1991). The mechanisms of power in modern 
governmentality form a complex and irreducible ensemble of the rationality and 
techniques of sovereignty, security, discipline and government. As space is limited we 
shall discuss disciplinary technology, pastorship, liberalism, and security, and ground 
our discussion of the theory with extracts from interviews regarding adolescent sexual 
and reproductive health conducted with health service providers at a regional hospital 
in South Africa. These interviews were conducted by the first author with service 
providers working in the Youth Health Centre (YHC), the School Health Services 
(SHS), the high risk Antenatal Clinic (ANC) and the Termination of Pregnancy (TOP) 
Clinic of the hospital. Preventive programmes (such as sexuality education in the 
schools and contraceptive counselling) are instituted, inter alia, to manage the risk of 
teenagers conceiving. The “curative” aspects (ante-natal care, termination of 
pregnancy, counselling by a social worker) are about the management of a new set of 
risks which the error (pregnancy) invokes. The focus here is on the prevention either 
of future problems regarding the child or of further error on the part of the mother. 
 
In these governmental institutions and procedures we have what Donzelot (1993) calls 
the socialisation of risk. Fate, fortune, destiny, which are individual matters over 
which little control can be exercised, are replaced with risk, the combination of 
factors over which the collective may exercise vigilance and management. The 
socialisation of risk operates in this case in the collective’s contribution to taxes 
which allow for the establishment of the YHC, SHS, ANC and TOP clinic. These 
centres, clinics and services represent the collective’s insurance against the risk of 
teenagers contributing to social problems and demographic disaster through early 
reproduction. The health service provider becomes the insurer of the physical, 
emotional and social well-being of the adolescent and her child, as well as the 
protector of the common good. The management of risk is achieved not only by the 
collective’s investment in institutions of health and welfare, however, but also by 
installing risk management at the individual level. The health service providers 
employ a variety of governmental techniques (including disciplinary surveillance, the 
incitement to technologies of the self, pastoral power, liberal individualisation and the 
provision of the confessional space) to render the adolescent and her family 
responsible for overseeing their own conduct and the associated personal risks. 
 
Disciplinary Technology, Surveillance and Bio-power  
 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977) traces the emergence of what he calls 
disciplinary technology. Prior to the 18th century, the sovereign’s power was 
displayed through public torture. The law represented the will of the king, with torture 
representing the activation of the king’s power on the body of the criminal. During the 
18th century, a group of humanist reformers proposed that crime be seen as a breach 
of contract in which society as a whole was the victim. Punishment would mean 
redressing the wrong done and assisting the transgressor in resuming his/her rightful 
place in society. The body was no longer tortured and dismembered, but trained, 
exercised and supervised. The torture meted out as punishment in sovereignty meant 
that only the most heinous of crimes were checked. Humanist reform introduced a 
“more finely tuned justice” (Foucault, 1977, p. 78) in which “lesser” crimes and 
misdemeanours could be identified and dealt with accordingly. For their system to 
work, in order for the authorities to assist in the reformation and rehabilitation of the 
criminal, an intimate knowledge of the individual was required. A “closer . . . 
mapping of the social body”  (Foucault, 1977, p. 78) was needed.  
 
Disciplinary technology has as its aim the regulation and normalisation of subjects. 
Although the individual ostensibly has more formal rights than previously, there is 
less room for deviance and disorder. Disciplinary technology operates through 
hierarchical observation and normalising judgement. Measurement and observation 
produce a knowledge in which it is possible to classify each subject in a system of 
gradated, hierarchical intervals. For example, the practices of research (investigation, 
observation, evaluation, analysis, calculation, codification, representation, etc.) 
produce a positive knowledge of the “normal” and of the pregnant teenager. Pregnant 
and non-pregnant teenagers are measured and compared regarding their biological 
precociousness, their psychological functioning, their cognitive capacities, their 
reproductive knowledge, their moral development, their social relations, their family 
formation and functioning, and their socio-economic status. Each subject—the 
“normal”, the high-risk potentially pregnant, the pregnant, and the mothering 
teenager—is gradated in a system of biological, psychological, moral, familial and 
social functioning. Surveillance is an integral part of the production and control of 
disciplinary technology. The authority (be it the warder, the school teacher, the health 
service provider) exercises a gaze over the inmates of the institution. This gaze is   
premised on normalising judgements concerning the behaviour of, for example, 
female teenagers. These judgements are embedded in dominant discourses of, for 
example, the nature of adolescence and femininity. Surveillance becomes powerful by 
extending itself to self-reflection and self-consciousness and, in this way, becomes 
one of the mechanisms linking the macro-issues of gender oppression with the micro-
level of gendered practices and relations:  
 
There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An 
inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end up interiorising 
to the point that he (sic) is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising 
surveillance over, and against himself (Foucault, 1980c, p. 155). 
As the individual invests in the tenets of a normalising judgement (e.g. normal 
behaviour and feelings during pregnancy), so s/he begins to exercise vigilance with 
regard to his/her own behaviour, monitoring whether what s/he does fits the norm. 
Regulation thus becomes self-regulation as the person subjects him/ herself to an 
internalised surveillance. This surveillance turned self-surveillance is linked to what 
Dean (1994) refers to as governmental self-formation, which he conceptualises as “the 
ways in which various authorities and agencies seek to shape the conduct, aspirations, 
needs, desires, and capacities of specified categories of individuals, to enlist them in 
particular strategies and to seek defined goals” (p. 156). These self-strategies require 
“the elaboration of certain techniques for the conduct of one’s relation with oneself” 
(Rose, 1996, p. 135), or technologies of the self. Rose (1996) delineates three forms 
of self-technologies—relating to the self epistemologically (know yourself), 
despotically (master yourself) and attentively (care for yourself).  
 
Technologies of the self are practised, firstly, under the authority of some system of 
“truth” and, secondly, under authoritative persons from the theological, psychological 
and pedagogical disciplines. The following extracts demonstrate how authorities may 
incite self-technologies of despotism. In these extracts two of the health service 
providers interviewed are discussing sexuality education provided at the YHC and at 
schools:  
 
Extract 1 
A: Tell her about the dangers of early sex. What should she avoid (.) Like the privacy 
(.) which is important. I like that very much. They will never do that in public. It’s 
you (.) female (.) who will give him privacy (.) and once you are together (.) and then 
the trouble starts. 
 
Extract 2 
B: We will give them [boys] information and such things (.) and explain the 
pregnancy (.) and how pregnancy occurs (1) explain the menstrual cycle so a lot of 
them has that information. (1) It will help them in the end, because there are safe 
periods. If they really can’t make it, how they use the safe periods. 
 
Three features emerge in the above extracts with regard to the gendering of the self 
technology of despotism concerning sexual relations, viz. control of access to he 
body; avoidance of particular situations; and the hydraulic sex drive. In the first 
extract adolescent women are warned of the “dangers of early sex” which is paired 
with an encouragement to patrol men’s access to their body. This type of warning is 
not extended to males (instead they are “informed”), and the incitement to control of 
sexual bodily access is absent. In order to implement access control, female teenagers 
are incited to employ the strategy of avoidance. Males are only partially encouraged 
in avoidance. They are informed that “if they really can’t make it”, then they may 
have sex, but in the “safe” period. The gendered nature of the hydraulic hypothesis 
concerning sexuality is evident here. Males are depicted as more at the mercy of their 
sexual desires than females. Thus, control of sexual urges, the patrolling of access to 
the body, and the avoidance of particular sexualised situations and relations are firmly 
placed in the domain of female rather than male mastery of the self. These incitements 
to gendered self-technologies rely, however, on macro-level dominant discourses and 
invoke normalised assumptions concerning femininity, sexuality and gendered 
relations. Of course, the success of these incitements depend on the extent to which 
the females advised in these self-technologies invest in the premises of the underlying  
normalising assumptions. 
 
Bio-power is the word which Foucault coined for the operation of disciplinary power 
on the body. It has two inter-related aspects. The first is the control of the human 
species in the form of the population (i.e. the macro-level); the second is control of 
the body (i.e. on the micro-level). In the first, bio-power represents “the endeavour . . . 
to rationalize problems presented by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living 
human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birth rate, longevity, 
race” (Foucault, 1997, cited in Dean, 1999, p. 99). In the second, bio-power divides 
the body into units that are taken up separately and subjected to precise, calculated 
and repetitive training. The aim is control and efficiency of operation both for the part 
and the whole. “Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of 
utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)” (Foucault, 
1977, p. 138). Foucault calls the latter the docile body. 
 
The field of teenage pregnancy is immanently conducive to the exercise of bio-power. 
Firstly, the teenager’s body is divided into reproductive organs (which need to be 
monitored and treated both in a state of pregnancy and non-pregnancy), and sexual 
organs (which go through certain “physical growth” stages, and to which access must 
be patrolled). Secondly, the concern with the rate of teenage pregnancy leading to the 
possibility of welfare dependency and the creation of an “underclass” or, 
alternatively, demographic problems is bound up with control of the “population”. 
The latter concern translates into a concern with the former, viz. gaining an 
understanding and intervening with regard to the adolescent’s body. 
 
Bio-power represented Foucault’s first foray into the links between the microphysics 
and macrophysics of power (Gordon, 1991). He reintroduced the theme of bio-power 
or bio-politics in his 1978 lectures on governmentality, indicating that modern bio-
politics generates a new kind of counter-politics. Biopolitics represents an example of 
what Foucault calls the “strategic reversibility” (cited in Gordon, 1991, p. 5) of power 
relations—the ways in which governmental practices can be turned into loci of 
resistance. Indeed, some feminist writers have referred to teenage childbearing as an 
“alternative life course” (Geronimus,1991), implying a resistance to and disruption of 
normalised life trajectories and dominant reproductive discourses on the part of these 
adolescents. The issue of resistance will be discussed more fully later in the paper. 
 
Pastoral Power 
 
Pastoral power is a form of power which has Hebraic roots but which only reached its 
full elaboration in the early Christian writings (Dean, 1994a). On the one hand, the 
politician, leader or authority is represented as a shepherd who is accountable for all 
members of the pastorate; s/he gathers and guides the flock, ensures their salvation 
through his/her kindness, and is devoted to knowing the flock as a whole and in detail. 
On the other hand, obedience, self-control, personal submission, mortification and a 
renunciation of the self and the world by the flock are encouraged. It was through 
institutional Christianity that the notions of pastorship, the care of others, and a 
dynamics of self-decipherment and self-renunciation were fully developed. Self-
technologies thus feature in pastoral power as well but are linked to the macro-
strategies of government through guidance and care, rather than surveillance and 
normalising judgement as in disciplinary technology. 
 
The deployment of pastoral techniques by the service providers mentioned above is 
evidenced in the following extracts, in which service providers discuss counselling 
teenagers seeking contraceptive advice (Extracts 3 and 4) and parents bringing their 
adolescent daughters for termination of pregnancy (Extract 5) or ante-natal care 
(Extract 6).  
 
Extract 3 
C: I would like to ask from her why she stays there [with her boyfriend]. [ ] And to 
enlighten her that it is not right to stay with a man before marriage. 
 
Extract 4 
D: They rely on us. They used to ask deep questions of which they can’t ask if it was 
a parent (.) you know /ya/. So you must be a friend to them. 
 
Extract 5 
E: We told her that “What you did to the child is wrong”. 
 
Extract 6 
C: I did try to calm her [ ] “pray to God”. 
 
The responsibility of the pastor is to guide the members of the flock. S/he knows what 
is good for them (like getting married—Extract 3) and thus can arbitrate concerning 
the moral correctness of actions and indicate the correct path in cases of incorrect 
action (Extract 3). Guidance takes place mostly through the technique of care. For 
example, in Extract 4 the service provider indicates that she is helpful and 
dependable. Recalcitrance is anticipated, however, in which case the pastor’s job is to 
chastise the perpetrator. In Extract 5 the service provider chastises a mother for 
forcing her daughter to take tablets that could induce an abortion. Various other 
techniques are utilised in pastoral care and guidance including comfort and 
supplication to a higher power (Extract 6). Power thus is installed on the micro-level 
in disciplinary technology and pastoral power through very different interactional 
practices (surveillance and normalising judgement versus guidance and care). 
However, in order for scientific normalising judgement and for pastoral moral 
arbitration and guidance to perform their work they both need to draw on dominant 
(i.e. macro-level) patriarchal discursive constructions of gendered subjectivity and 
gendered relations (e.g. Extract 3). How these constructions are presented will differ. 
For example, disciplinary technology may reinforce men’s conjugal authority in 
arguments concerning the detrimental economic, social and emotional outcomes of 
single parenthood (thereby normalising the nuclear family) rather than through an 
appeal to the moral correctness of marriage. Whichever way, men’s conjugal 
authority is reproduced and maintained. 
 
Liberalism 
 
The advent of liberalism saw a transformation in the relationship between knowledge 
and government. Foucault characterises it as “a doctrine of limitation and wise 
restraint” (Gordon, 1991, p. 15). Society is seen as generating its own order and 
prosperity, as constituting a quasi-nature, in accordance to which the affairs of 
humans must be governed. Spheres such as “civil society” or “the economy” are 
construed as outside direct political authority, having natural forces and relations 
intrinsic to them that must be respected by the authorities (Dean, 1999). Furthermore, 
state action is limited with regard to political subjects, whose individual rights, desires 
and needs cannot be dictated to by governments. These rights and liberties are 
simultaneously external to liberal political authority and necessary for its operation. 
Liberal modes of government act on “the governed as a locus of action and freedom” 
(Dean, 1999, p. 15). Freedom becomes a technical means of securing the ends of 
government through action, or the “conduct of conduct”, at a distance, and through 
the incitement to governmental self-formation. Consider the following extracts in 
which the service providers discuss counselling (Extracts 7, 9, 10, 11) and sexuality 
education programmes (Extract 8). 
 
Extract 7 
D: She is having a right to live, and also a right to decide. 
 
Extract 8 
F: There are many topics that they cover, but according to the need of that 
particular group 
 
Extract 9 
D: Respect that teenager. She is unique from other teenagers [ ] You have to 
accept them as they are. 
 
Extract 10 
A: You need to empathise [in counselling] You need to show that person that 
you are there and you are listening. 
 
Extract 11 
C: They tell you where the problem is and you find out from them which is the 
best way to solve the problem. 
 
One of the principle techniques of liberalism is individualisation in which the 
individual is accorded rights (Extract 7), uniqueness (Extracts 8 and 9), and obliged to 
be free (Extract 7). The liberal humanitarian’s task is to respect, accept (Extract 9) and 
empathise (Extract 10) with the person. S/he provides the space within which the 
teenager may render herself truthful to herself (Extract 10). Within this confessional 
space the teenager is permitted to confess the problem, and then to labour to find the 
solution or incited in governmental self-formation (Extract 11). Power operates here 
through the normalisation of the solutions and of the “true” self towards which the 
teenager is incited to labour. These solutions and the self are known intricately and in-
depth by the expert. Rose (1992) links expertise (in particular the psy-sciences) with 
liberalism’s rationality of government which seeks ethical techniques that 
simultaneously allows humans to conduct themselves as subjects of freedom and 
subjects of society. Expertise has “made it possible for us to dream that we can order 
our individual and collective existence according to a knowledge/technique that fuses 
truth and humanity, wisdom and practicality” (Rose, 1992, p. 367). It is through 
expertise that the apparently “public” issue of rationalities of government are linked in 
liberalism to the “private” question of how one should behave, how one “conducts” 
one’s own conduct. 
 
Security 
 
Foucault conceptualised apparatuses of security as “those institutions and practices 
concerned to defend, maintain and secure a national population and those that secure 
the economic, demographic and social processes that are found to exist within that 
population” (Dean, 1999, p. 20). He saw security as a specific principle of political 
method and practice, distinct from law, sovereignty and discipline. However, it is able 
to combine in various modes with these other practices. For example, under 
liberalism, liberty is a condition of security. The liberal task of setting into place 
forms of regulation that allow and facilitate natural regulation comprises “the setting 
in place mechanisms of security . . . mechanisms or modes of state intervention whose 
function is to assure the security of those natural phenomena, economic processes and 
the intrinsic processes of population” (Gordon, 1991, p. 17). 
 
Foucault ascribed three general traits to the method of security. Firstly, it deals with 
series of possible and probable events; secondly, it evaluates through the calculation 
of comparative cost; and thirdly, it prescribes “not by absolute binary demarcation 
between the permitted and the forbidden, but by the specification of an optimal mean 
within a tolerable bandwidth of variation” (Gordon, 1991, p. 20). Sovereignty takes as 
it object territory, discipline the body of the individual, and security the “ensemble of 
the population” (Gordon, 1991, p. 20). 
  
Security operates in adolescent sexual and reproductive health in a number of ways. 
The management of risk serves as a governmental tactic of security as it represents 
efforts to deal with the possible and probable events following sexual intercourse, 
conception and birth. Sexuality education programmes are run to manage the 
possibility or risk of adolescents either engaging in sex or conceiving. Should a 
teenager be pregnant, counselling, ante-natal care, adoption services and termination 
of pregnancy facilities are provided to manage the probability or risk of negative 
physiological, psychological, emotional and social consequences for the mother and 
child. These programmes are legitimated through the implicit  calculation of the 
comparative cost of providing services (which represent a tax burden) and not 
providing them (which would result in a threat to national and social security in terms 
of demographic difficulties, poor mothering practices, lack of gainful employment on 
the part of the teenager etc.). The optimal mean (the third trait of security) in terms of 
adolescent sexuality is abstinence from sex. However, sexual intercourse and even 
pregnancy lie within the acceptable bandwidth, but carry with them a different set of 
management tactics than does non-coital behaviour. Put simply, if the teenager is a 
virgin, there is the danger of the desire for sex, and thus sexuality education 
programmes recommend “say no”. If she is sexually active, there is the possibility of 
pregnancy, and thus programmes extend their input to the use of contraceptives. If she 
is pregnant, there are potential physical and emotional complications in the 
pregnancy, and thus professional medical and psychological assistance is indicated. If 
she is mothering, the child is probably at risk, and therefore professional assistance 
and maternal education are required. These traits of security will combine in various 
ways with pastoral, disciplinary and liberal power relations in the government of the 
sexual and reproductive lives of adolescents. 
 GOVERNMENTALITY, FEMINISM AND RESISTANCE 
 
In this section we examine some of the implications of Foucault’s work on 
governmentality in terms of feminist political practice. Feminism has centrally 
defined itself as an emancipatory project, whether in political practice or academic 
critique. Feminist critics of Foucauldian theory argue that emancipatory politics is not 
possible within a Foucauldian framework (Balbus, 1988; Deveaux, 1994; Di 
Leonardo, 1991; Harding, 1990, 1992; Hartsock, 1990; Hawkesworth, 1989). There 
are three main charges against Foucault in this regard, viz. nihilism, relativism and the 
omnipresence of power. Space does not allow a full exploration of the first two and 
readers are referred to Fraser (1989), Grimshaw (1993), Hekman (1990), Hoy (1988), 
Lather (1992), McNay (1992), Ramazanoglu (1993) and Sawicki (1988, 1991) for 
comprehensive responses to these concerns. Instead, we shall concentrate on the third 
issue, viz. the omnipresence of power. Because of his emphasis on the microphysics 
of power, power in Foucauldian terms is everywhere, say critics, and thus ultimately 
nowhere. Short of abolishing modern society altogether, social improvement is 
impossible, as successful resistance means simply changing one discursive identity 
for another, thus creating new oppressions. 
 
While Foucault shied away from political programmes and activities that were based 
on grand theory, his writings were clearly political. Deleuze puts it in this rather 
disrespectful way:  
 
Three centuries ago certain fools were astonished because Spinoza wished to see the 
liberation of man [sic], even  hough he did not believe in his liberty or even in his 
particular existence. Today new fools, or even the same ones reincarnated, are 
astonished because the Foucault who had spoken of the death of man took part in 
political struggle (Deleuze, 1988, p. 90). 
 
Foucault’s central political statements are those pertaining to resistance. Power, in 
Foucauldian terms, does not mean disciplinary or repressive power only, but also 
liberatory power. Foucault points out that power coexists with resistances to it. 
Resistance is both an element of the functioning of power and a source of its perpetual 
disorder (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). This is in direct contrast to the liberal notion of 
freedom as juxtaposed or opposite to power. Importantly, Foucault does not define 
power as the overcoming of resistances. When resistances are overcome, power 
relations collapse into force relations and the limits of power have been reached. 
 
In Foucauldian terms resistance takes the form of reverse or subjugated discourses 
and practices subverting hegemonic discourses and practices. These subjugated 
knowledges include those of the psychiatric patient, the hysteric, the midwife, the 
housewife, the teenage mother etc. Foucault does not see resistance as radical rupture 
or overt revolution. There is “no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt” 
(Foucault 1978, p. 96) but rather shifting points of resistance that “inflame certain 
parts of the body, certain moments in life” (Foucault, 1978, p. 96). What 
governmentality adds to this is the possibility of identifying and resisting 
concentrations of power. This does not mean a reversal to a “single locus of great 
Refusal”, but rather that alliances of shifting points of resistance around 
concentrations of power become a possibility. 
 
The implication of this in terms of feminist political practice is that such practice 
becomes a matter of alliances rather than one of unity around a universally shared 
interest (Allen & Baber, 1992). We would more rightly talk of the practice of 
feminisms. Within this politics, the aim is not to overcome differences in order to 
achieve political unity. Rather it is to use difference as a resource around which to 
establish multiple points of resistance to the myriad of micro- and macro-level 
gendered relations of inequality and domination. The commonality around gendered 
relations remains, but one strategy of resistance is not privileged over another. 
Feminist-informed governmental analyses may provide the intellectual grounds for 
holding diversity within commonality (i.e. making the links between micro-level 
practices and strategies of resistance and macro-level concentrations of power, e.g. 
patriarchy). This means that the practice of feminisms need not collapse into 
something in which anything goes. On the basis of specific theoretical analyses of 
particular struggles generalisations can be made, and patterns in power relations and 
the effectiveness of various strategies identified. 
 
In “The Subject and Power”, Foucault (1982) proposes a “new economy of power 
relations” in which the starting point is the forms of resistance to various forms of 
power. These forms of resistance have features in common, viz.: they are transversal, 
not being limited to particular countries, parties or economic forms; they struggle 
against power effects; they are “immediate” struggles in that they focus on issues 
closest to hand; they question the status of the individual whether by asserting the 
right to be different or by criticising the separation of the individual from the 
community; they oppose the effects of power which are linked to knowledge; they are 
a refusal of abstractions which determine who one is. Foucault advocates this type of 
resistance as an antidote to our modern forms of power: 
 
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we 
are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of 
political “double bind”, which is the simultaneous individualisation and 
totalisation of modern power structures. . . . We have to promote new forms of 
subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been 
imposed on us for several centuries (Foucault, 1982, p. 785). 
 
Liberation, thus, is not seen as transcendence or global transformation, but rather as a 
freeing from the assumption that prevailing ways of understanding ourselves and 
others are necessary and self-evident (even, for example, as feminists as post-feminist 
theorists would argue). Through the retrieval of subjugated knowledge one establishes 
a knowledge of resistance and struggle. Foucault is committed to the possibility that 
these resistances might eventually combine to create a new (non-disciplinary) form of 
power and thus a “new politics of Truth” (Balbus, 1988, p. 145). This form of politics 
will be subject to changing interests and fragmented and partial identities. 
 
Political analysis and criticism have in a large measure still to be invented—so too 
have the strategies which will make it possible to modify the relations of force, to co-
ordinate hem in such a way that such a modification is possible and can be inscribed 
in reality. That is to say, the problem is not so much that of defining a political 
“position” (which is to choose from a pre-existing set of possibilities) but to imagine 
and to bring into being new schemas of politicisation (Foucault, 1980c, p. 160). 
 
In many respects the forms of resistance described by Foucault in “The Subject and 
Power” seem to describe immanently the feminist project. Feminists have always 
struggled against gendered power effects; they have taken up issues closest to women 
(mothering, sexual violence etc.); they have questioned dominant patriarchal 
understandings of the nature of women; they have undermined dominant forms of 
knowledge regarding gender relations. However, feminism has not always been 
transversal, nor has it always refused abstractions. African, other “third world” and 
“minority” feminists have criticised “Western” feminism for its privileging of middle 
class, “white”, urban concerns (Brydon & Chant, 1989; Roberts, 1984). Differences 
among women have been ignored, and the differential impact on women of classism, 
racism and heterosexism overlooked. To some extent this has to do with the 
methodological legacies which feminist scholars inadvertently took over from their 
teachers, viz. attempts, which have their origin in the Enlightenment, to reveal 
general, all-encompassing, abstracting principles which can lay bare the basic features 
of natural and social reality (Nicholson, 1990). Foucauldian-based feminisms holds 
the promise of overcoming these difficulties while retaining a central focus on 
gendered oppression. Teenage pregnancy represents a field of inquiry that intersects 
many issues closest to women, viz. mothering, sexuality, reproduction, the family etc. 
As such there is surprisingly little feminist engagement with the topic. Following the 
outline of Foucauldian feminisms above, we would envisage the feminist project 
relating to teenage pregnancy involving some of the following practices:  (1) a 
deconstruction of the underlying taken-for-granted assumptions regarding mothering, 
the family, the adolescent, sexuality and reproduction that saturate scientific and 
popular discourse on reproductive adolescents; (2) a refusal of the depiction of 
reproductive adolescents as, for example, inadequate mothers, psychologically 
unstable, developmentally immature etc. as necessary or selfevident; (3) a location of 
adolescent sexual and reproductive practices within the historical and social 
specificities of localised settings while at the same time foregrounding gendered 
oppressions arising in these situations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have argued for the utility of Foucault’s theorising on   
governmentality or the feminist endeavour. Although Foucault never denied that the 
micro-strategies of power may get taken up in macro-strategies of oppression, his 
work on governmentality fills the gap concerning the interconnectedness of micro- 
and macro-levels of power analysis. With governmenality Foucauldian feminists are 
afforded a theoretical tool with which to analyse the complexity of oppressive 
relations of power that may take on diverse forms in modern society. The intersection 
of governmental tactics deployed in sovereignty, disciplinary technology, liberalism, 
pastoral power and security in producing and fixing gendered relations means that 
feminist analyses of gendered oppression, as well as resistances formulated against 
this oppression, needs to be multi-faceted and thorough. 
 
We turn, finally, to the application of such an approach in our country, South Africa. 
There is a large body of work on “women in developing countries”, but this does not 
necessarily engage feminist1 issues (Mohanty, 1991). We believe that a Foucauldian-
based practice of feminisms does not overshadow the efforts of “third world” and 
minority cultures to establish their own identities and literatures as oppositional to the 
hegemonic influences of patriarchal and imperialist capitalism, a concern expressed 
by Hartsock (1990). Instead it allows for the analysis of, and the practice of multiple 
sites of resistance against, the manifold ways in which both patriarchy and imperialist 
capitalism manifest themselves. Furthermore, a dynamic engagement with 
Foucauldian discourse may produce incisive analyses in the post-colonial era of the 
empire, as illustrated by Stoler (1995). Stoler creates a conversation with Foucault’s 
(1978) The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, extending Foucault’s thoughts with an analysis 
of the concepts and policies of imperial racism. Ultimately, of course, the radical 
nature of the Foucauldian endeavour must be judged on the basis of the effects it 
produces. 
 
NOTE 
 
1. While we acknowledge that the term feminism has been questioned by many 
women from developing countries on the grounds of cultural imperialism, we follow 
Mohanty (1991) in retaining the term, as South African women have always engaged 
with feminism, even if the label has been rejected in a number of instances. 
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